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Abstract
Collective wage agreements still play an important role in the German wage bar-
gaining system. However, there is a critical debate in Germany whether collective
agreements deliver the ﬂexibility needed by ﬁrms to adjust to the needs of interna-
tional competition and technological change. In recent years, the social partners in
some industries have responded to this possible lack of ﬂexibility by introducing so
called opening clauses into their collective bargaining agreements. These allow ﬁrms
to deviate from their collective agreement under certain conditions.
The aim of this paper is to empirically analyze the prevalence of opening clauses
in the German manufacturing sector and their impact on the wage structure. To
provide a basis for the empirical analyses, a survey on the existence and intensity
of opening clauses in central collective agreements has been conducted. Thereby,
these sectoral data about opening clauses are exactly combined with those from the
German Structure of Earnings Survey 1995 and 2001, a linked employer-employee
dataset from German oﬃcial statistics. The results show the number of collective
bargaining agreements containing opening clauses increasing remarkably since 1991.
Furthermore, the implementation of opening clauses into collective contracts creates
signiﬁcant eﬀects on wages.
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Zusammenfassung
Flächentarifverträge spielen im deutschen System der gemischten Lohnbildung
noch immer eine bedeutende Rolle. Ob die zentral verhandelten Verträge
den Betrieben ausreichende Möglichkeiten bieten, Löhne und Arbeitszeit an
die betrieblichen Rahmenbedingungen anzupassen, ist jedoch seit geraumer
Zeit Gegenstand einer zwischen Arbeitgebern und Gewerkschaften kontrovers
geführten Debatte. Flexible Anpassungen an die betriebliche Ebene sind gerade
vor dem Hintergrund des internationalen Wettbewerbs und technologischer
Veränderungen erforderlich. Seit den 90er Jahren werden daher die kollektiven
Tarifverträge zunehmend dadurch ﬂexibilisiert, dass Öﬀnungs- und Härteklauseln
vereinbart werden, die es den Betrieben erlauben, vom Tarifvertrag abwe-
ichende Regelungen zu treﬀen.
Ziel dieser Studie ist es, das Vorhandensein von Öﬀnungsklauseln im Pro-
duzierenden Gewerbe zu erfassen und die Auswirkungen auf die Lohnstruktur
zu untersuchen. Als Daten stehen Ergebnisse einer eigenen Erhebung zu Exis-
tenz und Grad der tarifvertraglichen Öﬀnung in verschiedenen Tarifbereichen
zur Verfügung. Diese werden der Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung 1995
und 2001 exakt zugespielt. Im Ergebnis zeigt sich, dass die Zahl der Flächen-
tarifverträge, die Öﬀnungsklauseln vorsehen, seit 1991 stark angestiegen ist.
Zudem lassen sich für die Einführung von Öﬀnungsklauseln zwischen 1995 und
2001 signiﬁkante Lohneﬀekte beobachten.
1 Introduction
Since the second half of the last century, regionally industry-wide central collective bar-
gaining agreements (CBA) have dominated the German system of wage setting. Since
the 1990’s, the system of collective bargaining has been criticized to be insuﬃciently ﬂex-
ible towards international competition and technological change (cf. Artus 2001, p. 97).
Therefore, an ongoing debate on decentralizing collective bargaining has started. Conse-
quently, the social partners have introduced so called opening clauses into central collective
contracts which allow to adapt these contracts to ﬁrm-speciﬁc needs. Until now, there is
a lack of empirical research on decentralised collective contracts mainly because suitable
data have not been available. This study uses newly available data collected from pub-
lic sources to focus on two main questions: First, which types of ﬂexible elements have
been introduced to central contracts and when have they been introduced? Second, what
impact of diﬀerent types of opening clauses on the wage structure can be observed?
Recent studies focussed mainly on the declining bargaining coverage which can be inter-
preted as ﬁrms’ requirement for ﬂexibility (cf. e.g. Kohaut/Schnabel 2003). Furthermore,
the existence of opening clauses on ﬁrm level and the question whether these are actually
used by ﬁrms is considered (cf. e.g. Kohaut/Schnabel 2006; Franz/Pfeiﬀer 2006). How-
ever, problematically in these studies is that ﬁrms actually not using opening clauses often
do not know if the relevant collective contracts contain opening clauses. Additionally,
these survey data provide only ﬁrm level information.
The present study uses data on the existence of opening clauses in collective bargaining
agreements which has been collected from public sources. These are merged to the German
Survey on Earnings Structure which is a linked employer-employee data set from oﬃcial
statistics. For each ﬁrm and its workers it is known, if the collective bargaining agreement
contains opening clauses but not if the ﬁrms actually make use of it. So, it is now possible
to analyse the impact of existing opening clauses on the wage structure.
The remainder of this study is as follows. Section 2 describes diﬀerent types of collective
bargaining ﬂexibility and presents empirical evidence for the years 1991 to 2004. Section 3
analyses the impact of opening clauses on the wage structure and section 4 concludes.
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2 More Flexibility within Central Collective Bargaining
Agreements
2.1 Diﬀerent Types of Flexibility
In the German bargaining system central collective bargaining agreements are only legally
binding if both the worker is a union member and the ﬁrm is member of the employers’
association. In case a ﬁrm is not, even a unionized worker is not entitled to the collectively
bargained wage. Consequently, unions favor ﬁrms to be covered under a collective contract.
In former times, wages and working time were ﬁxed in the collective contracts by the social
partners for all covered ﬁrms. The ﬁxed wages constituted a kind of minimum wage. All
ﬁrms were allowed to pay a higher wage than the bargained , according to the legal principle
of favourability ("Günstigkeitsprinzip").
Since some years, employers have demanded more ﬂexibility, because e.g. rising prices
for raw materials or labor costs or ﬁrms entering international competition. Therefore,
ﬁrms tend to leave CBA coverage. Wages would be then bargained at the ﬁrm level or
individually. The social partners have answered this demand for ﬂexibility by introducing so
called opening clauses which allow ﬁrm-speciﬁc adaptations of wages or working time under
certain conditions such as tough competition, economic crisis or impending bankruptcy.
However, collective contracts without any ﬂexible elements still exist. In the following, four
regimes of collective bargaining are distinguished: central bargaining agreements without
any opening clauses, with opening clauses on working time, with wage-related opening
clauses and ﬁrm-speciﬁc agreements.
Working time related opening clauses enable ﬁrms to lower or increase working time for
almost all employees. Opening clauses concerning wages mostly allow ﬁrms to cut down
or even suspend the payment of vacation or Christmas bonuses, in some cases permit to
postpone pay rate increases by several months or even withdraw from a former rise. In
the following, our main focus lies on the actual eﬀect on the wage structure caused by
implementing opening clauses. As there are many diﬀerent opening clauses with many
diﬀerent regulations on either or both wages and working time, two types of opening
clauses are diﬀerentiated (cf. table 1).
Opening clauses on working time include all opening clauses concerning working time
regulations which do neither aﬀect the wage directly nor indirectly. Wage-related opening
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Table 1: Types of opening clauses
on opening clauses on working time wage-related opening clauses
allowing the decreasing or increasing of
weekly working time or changing work sched-
ules within a day, a week or even within a
year (e.g. working time account). Wages
may not be aﬀected.
allowing cutting down or suspending pay-
ments or postponing or withdrawing a wage
rate increase and/or allowing the decreasing
or increasing of weekly working time while
wages are aﬀected.
clauses include opening clauses aﬀecting wages directly or indirectly by aﬀecting working
time in some speciﬁc ways. But how relevant are these diﬀerent types of ﬂexibility within
the collective bargaining system?
2.2 Prevalence of Opening Clauses
Until now, suitable data for empirical research on opening clauses had not been available.
As information on opening clauses is recorded within the collective contracts, these are
suitable sources being available to the public. Information on opening clauses has been
collected in an own survey using data from public registers on collective contracts1. The
data set on opening clauses actually covers ﬂexible elements in manufacturing industry in
the German federal state of Baden-Wuerttemberg during the time period between 1991
and 2004. Besides information whether certain working time or wage adaptations to the
ﬁrm level are allowed, the year of introduction as well as detailed rules to each opening
clause are reported.
At ﬁrst, a look at the structure of opening clauses in diﬀerent years is taken (cf. ﬁgure
1). Starting in 1991, four out of ﬁve collective contracts were inﬂexible, in other words,
there was no possibility to adapt wages or working time to the ﬁrm level. About 6% of
collective contracts had opening clauses on working time. Astonishingly, in 1996 a lot
of social partners had introduced wage-related opening clauses in almost a quarter of all
contracts. This share has risen between 1996 and 2004 to 53%. However, the share of
contracts without any ﬂexible elements remained at a share of almost a quarter.
1All collective contracts are registered by the Ministry of Labor Baden-Wuerttemberg and also available
at the WSI-Tarifarchiv. See Heinbach (2005, p. 57) for a detailed description of the data set on opening
clauses.
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Figure 1: Manufacturing relevant collective contract with opening clauses, Baden-
Württemberg, 1991-2004. Source: data set on opening clauses, own calculations.
As diﬀerent shares of workers are covered by these collective contracts, table 2 reports the
share of covered workers by diﬀerent ﬂexible contracts each in 1995 and 2001. The share
of workers covered by CBA with wage-related opening clauses has increased from 6% to
81% of all covered workers between 1995 and 2001 (cp. table 2). The share of workers
being covered by collective contracts only allowing working time related opening clauses
has risen slightly from 6% to 10%. Finally, in 2001 only a share of 9% were covered by a
collective contract without any ﬂexible elements.
Summing up, ﬁgure 1 as well as table 2 show the system of central collective bargaining
having been partly decentralized by introducing ﬂexible elements such as opening clauses,
although not all collective bargaining agreements contain such ﬂexible elements. The share
of workers being covered by a central collective contract with opening clauses was at 90%
in 2001. As opening clauses lead to a more heterogeneous structure of the collective
contract landscape, this fact has to be taken into account when the impact on wages is
analysed in the next section.
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Table 2: Share of workers which are covered by a collective contract in the manufacturing
sector in Baden-Württemberg. Source: German Structure of Earnings Survey 1995, 2001;
own calculations.
% of workers
Collective Contract with ... 1995 2001
opening clauses on working time 6 81
wage-related opening clauses 6 10
without any opening clauses 78 9
Total 100 100
3 Analyzing the Impact of Diﬀerent Flexible Wage Set-
ting Regimes on the Wage Structure
3.1 Theoretical Considerations
The impact of collective bargaining on the wage structure has been analysed both by the-
oretical and empirical studies. Research on the German system of wage setting result in
collective bargained wages to be higher compared to individually agreed ones (cf. e.g.
Bechtel et al. 2006; Fitzenberger et al. 2006; Gerlach/Stephan 2005), whereas the study
of Alda et al. (2005) does not ﬁnd signiﬁcant wage diﬀerences between individually and
collectively bargained wages. Furthermore, these studies point out that the wage dis-
tribution is likely to be more compressed under collective bargaining regimes. All these
studies use only one or two regimes of collective bargaining: central and ﬁrm-speciﬁc
bargaining. As this study analyzes the impact of diﬀerent ﬂexible collective contracts on
the wage structure, four collective wage-setting regimes are distinguished: central bar-
gaining agreements without any opening clauses, with opening clauses on working time,
with wage-related opening clauses and ﬁrm-speciﬁc agreements. Based on these four dif-
ferent collective wage-setting regimes, potential consequences for the wage structure are
discussed shortly in the following.
There can be found several reasons why some collective bargaining agreements have not
provided any ﬂexible element until now. Negotiations on implementing opening clauses
have not been concluded successfully yet, while ﬁrms do not demand ﬂexibility, because
wages and working time both being ﬁxed in a collective contract ﬁts their requirements.
This could be the case if wages are quite low and working time is adequate. Compared to
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individually bargained wages, they may be higher with a compressed distribution.
If ﬁrms are only confronted with order inﬂow not being constant over time or similar
situations, they solely demand a more ﬂexible arrangement of working time. Even without
opening clauses, ﬁrms can extend working time, but they have to pay overtime bonuses.
To prevend ﬁnancial losings for the ﬁrms, opening clauses on working time now allow these
to arrange working time ﬂexibly without having to pay overtime bonuses. Bargaining more
ﬂexible working time arrangements may result in unions demanding a higher wage increase
to compensate forgone overtime bonuses. So, compared to wages under central collective
bargaining without opening clauses, wages may be higher.
Firms suﬀering from a high wage level set by the collective contract demand possibilities
to lower labor costs when they are faced with an economic crisis, though competition or
impended bankruptcy. According to Fitzenberger and Franz (1999), unions act as follows
when opening clauses and wage increase are bargained at the same time: by demanding
a wage increase, unions consider only the better-oﬀ ﬁrms , as they know the bad ﬁrms
are likely to apply the opening clauses immediately, resulting in a decrease in wages. So,
unions undertake a kind of wage diﬀerentiation. However, the overall wage eﬀect after
the introduction of opening clauses is not clear. Hypothetically, the overall wage level
would increase, if no ﬁrm applied the nowexisting opening clauses. But, the new wage
level could be less or more than the old, depending on the number of ﬁrms applying the
opening clauses immediately. Wage dispersion would increase if only some ﬁrms lowered
their wages and others payed the higher bargained wage. But in a situation where almost
every ﬁrm will adapt opening clauses e.g. in an overall economic crisis, wage dispersion is
likely to be compressed and the wage level will almost certainly be lower.
At last, ﬁrms can leave central collective contracts and bargain wages ﬁrm-speciﬁcally.
Compared to the central level, ﬁrms may proﬁt from decentralised bargaining, because
ﬁrm-speciﬁc particularities can be explicitly considered. Consequently, the wage level is
expected to decrease if ﬁrms suﬀer from economical disadvantages. The other way around,
if ﬁrms are well oﬀ, ﬁrm-speciﬁc bargaining may lead to a higher wage level compared to the
central bargained wage, because unions proﬁt more from the ﬁrms’ revenues. However,
there might be some additional cost for the ﬁrm if bargaining takes place on the ﬁrm
level like strikes or the costs of contracting, while these costs are borne by unions and
employers’ associations in central bargaining. So, ﬁrms face the decision between more
ﬂexibility solutions on the one hand and lower costs and possibly increased social peace on
the other. The next section presents descriptive statistics for the diﬀerent wages setting
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regimes.
3.2 Data and Descriptive Evidence
The impact of diﬀerent bargaining regimes on the wage is analyzed by using the German
Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES). The GSES is a linked employer-employee data set
containing representative data from ﬁrms and their workers in the manufacturing sector
including two independent cross sections in 1995 and 2001. Detailed information on
workers’ wages, working time and individual as well as ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics has
been collected by German oﬃcial statistics using a two-stage random sample design. At
the ﬁrst stage, a random sample stratiﬁed by region, industry and ﬁrm size has been
taken out of all ﬁrms belonging to the manufacturing sector as well as parts of the service
industries2. Afterwards, workers had been chosen randomly at the ﬁrm level. This paper
uses a subsample of the GSES, containing ﬁrms with 100 to 10,000 employees from the
manufacturing industries in the federal state of Baden-Württemberg. At the ﬁrm level,
only blue-collar workers working more than 30 hours a week are considered.
The identiﬁer of the individually applied collective contract marks the key variable of the
present study. Data provides information whether an individual worker is paid accordingly
to an individual, a ﬁrm-speciﬁc or a central bargaining agreement, as well as which speciﬁc
collective contract has been applied. This creates an interface to enrich the sample with
additional agreement-speciﬁc information. The data chosen from GSES data is merged
with the data set on opening clauses to get also information whether the individually
applied central collective contract contains opening clauses.
To analyze the impact of diﬀerent types of opening clauses on the wage structure, ﬁve
diﬀerent wage-setting regimes are distinguished: there are collective contracts without
any opening clauses, with opening clauses on working time and with wage-related opening
clauses on a central level, and ﬁrm-speciﬁc and individually agreed contracts on the ﬁrm
level. Table 5 presents descriptive statistics for all variables used in the study, separated
by wage-setting regimes.
Table 3 summarizes log hourly wages by wage-setting regimes. The log of gross hourly
wage is computed using the gross monthly compensation3 divided by the monthly working
2For descriptions of the GSES data set see Hafner (2006) or Frank-Bosch (2003)
3Gross monthly compensation without any bonuses and premiums
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time4. In both years, wages under collective contracts are higher on average (1995: > 2.55,
2001:> 2.66) than individually agreed wages (1995: 2.44, 2001: 2.55). Bargained wages
covered by collective contracts allowing wage-related opening clauses, are , on average,
the lowest in 1995, but not in 2001. Wages under a collective regime with opening clauses
on working time are the highest in 2001. Wage dispersion is measured by the standard
deviation of log hourly wages. It diﬀers only slightly between 0.19 and 0.26 in both years.
The wage dispersion by wage-setting regimes has been reduced for the ﬁrm level contracts
and has increased for collective agreements with wage-related opening clauses between
1995 and 2001.
Table 3: Descriptive statistics of log gross hourly wages, blue-collar workers in ﬁrms with
100 - 10,000 employees in the manufacturing sector, Baden-Württemberg. Source: GSES
1995, 2001, own calculations.
collective bargaining agreement ﬁrm level individual
log hourly wage w/o oc working time oc wage-related oc contract contract
mean (1995) 2.60 2.59 2.55 2.56 2.44
s.d. (1995) 0.21 0.26 0.19 0.23 0.25
# obs. 32019 3091 4126 1132 6758
# ﬁrms 846 84 106 31 345
mean (2001) 2.66 2.80 2.73 2.70 2.55
s.d. (2001) 0.19 0.24 0.23 0.19 0.25
# obs. 1400 1846 10860 815 4123
# ﬁrms 46 72 365 23 209
A look at the box-plots in ﬁgure 2 illustrates the wage distributions by wage-setting regimes.
The median is represented by the line in the middle of the box, whereas the boundaries
represent the 25th and 75th quantiles, respectively. The already mentioned ﬁndings are
completed by looking at the dispersion and especially at the outliers represented by the
circles. Wages under collective coverage with wage-related opening clauses have the widest
dispersion with numerous outliers in both directions.
Summing up, there is descriptive evidence for the theoretical considerations mentioned
above. The results are also consistent with ﬁndings of other studies using the same or
comparable data (cf. e.g. Bechtel et al. 2006; Fitzenberger et al. 2006; Gerlach/Stephan
2005). As diﬀerences of means and shares of covariables point out (cf. table 3), individual
or ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics may inﬂuence the diﬀerences in average wages by wage-
4Working time without any overtime
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Figure 2: Box plots of log gross hourly wages, blue-collar workers in ﬁrms with 100 -
10,000 employees in the manufacturing sector, Baden-Württemberg. Source: German
Structure of Earnings Survey 1995, 2001; own calculations.
setting regimes. So, the next section investigates these issues.
3.3 A First Approach Using Pooled Ordinary Least Squares
The paper further uses an expanded Mincer (1974) wage equation to answer the question
which impact ﬂexible elements within collective contracts have on wages and how this has
changed between 1995 and 2001. The log hourly wage of an individual worker lnwi is
explained through a set of individual characteristics xi like age, education and tenure:
ln wi = x
′
iβ + ui . (1)
The error ui holds the usual assumptions. To account for the eﬀects of diﬀerent wage-
setting regimes, dummy variables d_oci for four collective bargaining regimes are assigned.
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Individual contracts hold as the reference category. As GSES data consists of two cross-
sections in 1995 and 2001, the variables are independently but not identically distributed.
Therefore, a dummy variable for the time d2001 is added to equation (1) , as well as dummy
variables for the interaction of year and central collective agreements d_2001 · d_oci .
The interaction variables cover all additional time based eﬀects such as increases in wages
or prices:
ln wi = x
′
iβ + δ0 · d2001 + γ1 · d_oci + δ1 · (d2001 · d_oci) + ui . (2)
As heteroscedasticity has been found in all models, the resulting equation is estimated
using pooled ordinary least squares with hetero-scedasticity-consistent standard errors (cf.
Wooldridge 2002, p. 129).
The log wage ln wi is explained using a large set of exogenous variables xi which are
described shortly. Individual workers’ age and age squared control for individual experience
besides schooling and tenure. Years of schooling and tenure cover the individual and ﬁrm-
speciﬁc human capital. As the return of age and tenure is assumed to be non-linear,
squares of these variables are considered. Tenure and tenure squared control additionally
for seniority, both resulting in workers with higher tenure earning more than their colleagues
with equal qualiﬁcation or productivity. Dummy variables account for speciﬁc individual
characteristics like sex, qualiﬁcation level5, payment type6 and extraordinary working time7.
Dummy variables for diﬀerent classes of ﬁrm size and diﬀerent belongings to industries8
control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics.
Table 6 reports the results of the estimates of equation (2), where three diﬀerent speciﬁ-
cations of covariates are presented to check for robustness of the estimation. Model (3)
includes age and tenure squared whereas the square of these variables is left out in (1)
and (2). Model (3) uses an additional dummy variable for workers in ﬁrms with more than
200 and less than 499 employees.
Model (1) explains the log hourly wage only by using dummy variables for the diﬀerent
bargaining regimes, the year 2001 and interaction dummies for the bargaining regime in
2001. All estimated variables have positive signs and are highly signiﬁcant. Compared
to individually agreed wages in 1995, wages of covered workers are on average at least
10.7%9 higher, whereas wage-related opening clauses have the lowest impact. In the year
5Workers are put into four groups: high skilled, skilled, semi skilled and unskilled workers.
6Workers were paid according to their working time or receive a piecework or bonus wages.
7Such as working on Sundays or during night.
8The industry sector is computed using the two digit NACE classiﬁcation.
9Coeﬃcients of the dummy variables are transformed by eβ − 1.
10
2001 an overall wage increase by 10.4% can be observed with all workers. The more
ﬂexible collective contracts have an additional wage-increasing eﬀect by at least 8.8% on
average. These huge positive eﬀects decline if a full set of explanatory variables is con-
sidered (model (2), (3)). Only one coeﬃcient changes its sign: the interaction between
wage-related opening clauses and the year 2001 dummy variable has now a slightly neg-
ative eﬀect, 0.9% on average. In total, collective bargaining with wage-related opening
clauses in 2001 increases wages by about 6.2%. Wages under collective bargaining with
working time opening clauses are 12.5% higher than individually agreed wages. The coeﬃ-
cients of the other variables are all highly signiﬁcant and have the expected sign compared
to similar studies (e.g Bechtel et al. 2006; Gerlach/Stephan 2003). Especially individual
characteristics like age, tenure and education have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the wage level.
As expected, the impact of tenure and age is not linear, because the coeﬃcients of the
squared variables are signiﬁcantly negative. An additional year of schooling increases the
wage by 1.6%. Female workers are to earn about 12.1% less than their male colleagues
with equal qualiﬁcation. The wage increase is signiﬁcantly positive if the worker is skilled
compared to a unskilled workers by at least 6.6%. The wage also increases if the level
of skill increases (high skilled: 26.9%). Diﬀerent types of incentive wages (bonus wage,
piecework wage) further increase the wage level compared to a wage based only on work-
ing hours. This is also true for working on Sunday or during night. Furthermore, wages
increase with the ﬁrm size. If the reference category are ﬁrms with 100 to 199 employees,
this increase is even higher. For workers in ﬁrms with more than 1000 employees, the
wage is on average 7.7% higher.
To evaluate the diﬀerent models, additional tests like LR-Test and Wald-Test are con-
ducted. The Wald-Test with the null hypothesis that δ0 = δ1 = 0 does not hold on any
reasonable signiﬁcance level. A likelihood-ratio test evaluates the goodness of ﬁt with dif-
ferent models. The test favors the model (3). There is no evidence for using a restricted
model.
In a second step, the ﬁrm-speciﬁc mean and ﬁrm-speciﬁc standard deviation of log hourly
wages are computed and explained through an analogous set of variables:
ln w¯j = x
′
jβ + δ0 · d2001 + γ1 · d_ocj + δ1 · (d2001 · d_ocj) + νj (3)
σj,lnwi = z
′
jβ + δ0 · d2001 + γ1 · d_ocj + δ1 · (d2001 · d_ocj) + εj . (4)
The variables xj represent the mean of discrete or continous variables or the share of the
dummy variables xi in equation (2), zj represents the ﬁrm-speciﬁc standard deviation or the
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share of variables xi . The dummy variables representing the wage-setting regimes equal
unity if the majority of workers in the ﬁrm are paid according to the respective regime.
Model (1[µ]) and (3[µ]) (cf. table 6) present estimates for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc mean of the
log hourly wage whereas model (1[σ]) and (3[σ]) present estimates for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc
standard deviation of the log hourly wage. Model (1[µ]) ﬁnds positive signs with all
coeﬃcients of the eﬀects in model (1) on a one precent signiﬁcance level. With the
full set of variables integrated in model (3[µ]), the comparable changes can be observed,
whereas some coeﬃcients like age and age squared lose their signiﬁcance. Furthermore,
the coeﬃcients are mostly smaller than with individual wages. The impact of diﬀerent
wage-setting regimes are also comparable.
The ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage dispersion is measured using the standard deviation of individual log
hourly wages. Collective bargaining leads to a compression within the wage distribution.
The respective coeﬃcients in model (3[σ]) have a negative sign, signiﬁcant at least at a 5%
level. But the interaction eﬀect is not signiﬁcant. Only in model (1[σ]) and using a reduced
set of variables the interaction of the year 2001 and wage-related opening clauses widens
the distribution slightly. This type of opening clauses compresses the wage distribution
most, holding all other variables constant. The explanatory power of both speciﬁcations
is small considering the adjusted coeﬃcient of determination R2.
To sum up, the positive sign of the interaction variable in model (3) and (3[µ]), covering
the implementation of opening clauses on working time between 1995 and 2001, can
be interpreted as a wage increasing eﬀect, whereas the implementation of wage-related
opening clauses has a slightly negative eﬀect. Fitzenberger and Franz (1999) argue
using an insider-outsider framework that the implementation of opening clauses leads to a
higher wage increase because unions consider the economic situation of the ﬁrms in their
negotiations. They conduct "wage diﬀerentiation" by splitting the ﬁrms into two groups:
a better-oﬀ group that is able to pay a higher wage increase and a worse-oﬀ group of ﬁrms
negotiating ﬁrm-speciﬁc deviations or adapting opening clauses immediately. This wage-
increasing eﬀect can be found with working time related ﬂexibilization. Furthermore, the
less compressed wage distribution compared to other central bargaining regimes supports
the idea of wage diﬀerentiation. The wage-related opening clauses fulﬁll the expectation
that a negative wage eﬀect can be observed.
Comparing the two types of opening clauses, opposite interaction impacts have been de-
tected. Two reasons may explain these opposite eﬀects. A more decentralized central
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wage-setting regime causes a higher wage increase especially if opening clauses on work-
ing time ﬂexibilisation are considered. This may represent "a price" for the ﬂexibilisation,
because the wage level at the beginning is not that high. Considering only wage-relevant
opening clauses, the eﬀect is just converse. Workers in ﬁrms under CBA coverage with
the possibility of adapting opening clauses ceteris paribus earn higher wages compared to
their colleagues in ﬁrms without those possibilities in 1995. So, ﬁrms with the possibility
to adapt opening clauses have payed higher wages, maybe due to an unobserved variable.
If opening clauses had been available for many more ﬁrms in 2001, wages would have
been decreased. Comparing wages in 2001 under CBA coverage with and without opening
clauses, the lower values with the wage-related opening clauses could be an evidence for
more ﬁrms adapting those opening clauses.
However, the model used does not account for causality, i.e. variables controlling the
eﬀect of opening clauses may be endogenous. In case heterogeneous ﬁrms or industry
sectors being able to apply opening clauses, the dummy variable on opening clauses would
be correlated with the ﬁrm- or industry-speciﬁc performance, especially in a case were the
relevant variables are not explicitly modeled or not observable.
3.4 A Second Estimation Controlling Endogeneity
If one or more variables of equation (2) are not strictly exogenous, all corresponding
coeﬃcients will be inconsistent (cf. Wooldridge 2002, p. 83). As the intention of this
study is to measure the eﬀect of wage-setting regimes on the individual wage, the dummy
variables should be checked to be exogenous.
It has to be challanged whether the eﬀect of opening clauses found in the previous section
is strictly exogenous. Considering collectively bargained wages depend on ﬁrm- or industry-
speciﬁc characteristics which are not explicitly modeled, the assumption E(d_oci |ui) = 0
might not be fullﬁlled. Empirical studies explaining the determinants of ﬁrms’ collective
bargaining decision ﬁnd, besides ﬁrm size or share of female employees, ﬁrm-speciﬁc vari-
ables like workers council, ownership and age of the ﬁrm have a signiﬁcant inﬂuence (cf.
e.g. Kohaut/Bellmann 1997; Kohaut/Schnabel 2003). So, ﬁrms’ decisions to bargain col-
lectively are not exogenous. Unfortunately, the GSES does not provide any information
about works councils, ownership or the age of ﬁrms.
In the following, the dummy variable for collective bargaining agreements without opening
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Table 4: Partial correlation between instrumented and instrumental variables. Source:
own calculations
Part.Corr. CBA w/o OC CBA with OC
CBA w/o OC(2nd lag) 0.9056 -0.9056
employment share
of collective contract area 0.1060 -0.1060
clauses d_cba is expressed as a function of instrument variables z which are uncorrelated
with the error term u in equation (2):
d_cba = g(x, z) + v (5)
cov(z, u) = 0, (6)
Collective contracts without opening clauses are instrumented, because there are alterna-
tive ﬂexible systems of wage setting, like agreements with opening clauses, ﬁrm-speciﬁc
or individual agreements. The diﬃculty of a two-stage least squares estimation using in-
strument variables is to ﬁnd "good" instruments for the dummy variable d_cba. Two
variables representing the collective contract are used as instruments z . The second lag
of the dummy variable for opening clauses indicates whether the opening clauses had been
already introduced in 1993 (for 1995) or 1999 (for 2001)10. Employment shares of the
collective bargaining area diﬀer across wage-setting regimes and seem to have no inﬂu-
ence on the wage equation. It can be argued, that the introduction of opening clauses
might not be that easy in large collective contract areas with a huge share of covered
workers, due to union power. The partial correlation coeﬃcients are presented in table 4.
Obviously, a high positive correlation can be found between a collective contract without
opening clauses and its second lag. The correlation with the employment share is positive
but small.
Table 7 reports the results of the estimates, using diﬀerent instrument variables for the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc mean and standard deviation of log hourly wages. Model (3[µ]) and (3[σ])
use the full set of instrumental variables: employment share and lagged opening clauses
information. Models (1[µ])-(2[σ]) each use only one of these instrumental variables. Due
to collinearity, some variables e.g. dummy variables for the wage-setting regimes have
10In 1995 and 2001 the ﬁrst lag of the dummy variable for opening clauses is equal to the original value
of the dummy variable for opening clauses.
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been dropped.
The estimated coeﬃcients deliver similar results compared to the pooled ordinary least
squares models. Therefore, only the coeﬃcients of the wage-setting regimes, the inter-
action terms and the instruments used in the regression will be discussed. Model (1[µ])
explains the ﬁrm-speciﬁc mean of log hourly wages, where the dummy variable for collective
bargaining without opening clauses is assumed to be endogenous. It is instrumented using
the employment share of collective contract areas. The eﬀect of collective bargaining is
positive, highly signiﬁcant and, compared to the ﬁrst approach, much larger in absolute
values. A reason for this could be the dummy of ﬁrm-speciﬁc agreements being dropped
due to collinearity, so that the amount of coeﬃcients cover this eﬀect, too. Unfortunately,
this cannot be separated. The coeﬃcients of the interaction dummy variables have the
same sign as those in the pooled ordinary least squares models, but with opposite signif-
icance. Regarding model (2[µ]) and (3[µ]) the signs are the same, whereas the positive
eﬀect of the opening clauses related to working time is signiﬁcant, but the negative eﬀect
of the wage-related opening clauses is not. In both models the lagged variables of opening
clauses are used. Furthermore, the dummy variables for ﬂexible collective bargaining are
dropped due to collinerarity.
Explaining the dispersion of log hourly wages, no eﬀect of wage setting can be observed,
except a compression in case of collective agreements with wage-related opening clauses.
To evaluate the diﬀerent models, a Sargan-Test on overidentifying instruments (model
(3)) and a Hausman-Test with the null hypothesis the diﬀerences in coeﬃcients not being
systematic are conducted. The Sargan-Test indicates that the chosen instruments do not
overidentify the equation. The Hausman-Test has found there are systematic diﬀerences
in the coeﬃcients with all models. In summary, pooled ordinary least squares can be
considered inconsistent, two stage least squares cannot. Evidence for endogeneity of the
wage-setting system has been detected.
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4 Summary and Outlook
This study estimates the impact of diﬀerent wage-setting systems on the wage structure,
using data from oﬃcial statistics and additional information about decentralization in cen-
tral collective bargaining agreements. Empirical results point out that individual wages
under collective bargaining coverage are signiﬁcantly higher than individual agreed ones,
whereas the wage distribution compresses. Furthermore, the implementation of open-
ing clauses between 1995 and 2001 has an additional eﬀect on wages. Opening clauses
on working time increased wages between 1995 and 2001, whereas wage-related opening
clauses had a wage reducing eﬀect, both compared with wages under central collective
bargaining coverage without opening clauses. However, the share of ﬁrms covered by a
central agreement and paying a wage higher than the collectively bargained one is still high
(Kohaut/Schnabel 2003). The negative impact of wage-related opening clauses between
1995 and 2001 can be interpreted such that some ﬁrms actually adapt those wage-related
opening clauses. As the results reﬂect particularities of the manufacturing industries in
the German federal state of Baden-Wuerttemberg, they should be interpreted carefully. A
generalization for whole Germany is only suitable to a limited extent,but still, the results
reveal a general tendency.
This study focusses on wage-related opening clauses which allow ﬁrms to lower wages
under certain conditions. From an theoretical point of view, it would be also interesting
whether freely bargained minimum wages are a more eﬃcient instrument to satisfy the
ﬁrms’ requirements, because, in this case, ﬁrms would be able to aﬀord the bargained
wage at any time while also being enabled to pay higher wages, each depending on their
economic situation. So, opening clauses represent an instrument to adapt central collec-
tive bargaining agreements to ﬁrm-speciﬁc needs, at a time where other, probably more
economically eﬃcient solutions are absent.
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Table 6: Regression analysis of individual log gross hourly wage in the blue-collar workers’
group in the manufacturing sector, Baden-Wuerttemberg, 1995 and 2001.
Source: GSES 1995, 2001; own calcualations.
individual wage ﬁrm-speciﬁc mean ﬁrm-speciﬁc standard deviation
ln(wage) (1) (2) (3) (1[µ]) (3[µ]) (1[σ]) (3[σ])
Dummy year 2001 0.099 0.104 0.101 0.11 0.097 0.009 0.011
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.040)** (0.012)**
CBA w/o oc 0.152 0.05 0.047 0.139 0.034 -0.022 -0.024
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
dummy working time oc 0.148 0.029 0.027 0.143 0.027 0.007 -0.018
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.121) (0.247) (0.024)**
dummy wage-related oc 0.107 0.076 0.069 0.1 0.064 -0.035 -0.038
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
dummy ﬁrm-speciﬁc agreement 0.128 0.063 0.063 0.128 0.058 -0.018 -0.027
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)*** (0.008)*** (0.000)***
d_2001timeoc 0.104 0.091 0.092 0.106 0.095 -0.012 0.003
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.000)*** (0.279) (0.783)
d_2001wageoc 0.084 -0.015 -0.009 0.073 -0.006 0.012 0.01
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.013)** (0.001)*** (0.688) (0.050)* (0.193)
age/10 0.002 0.1 0.125 0.08
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.127) (0.001)***
(age/10)2 -0.012 -0.013 -0.007
(0.000)*** (0.157) (0.020)**
tenure/10 0.039 0.086 0.147 0.017
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.238)
(tenure/10)2 -0.014 -0.027 -0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.791)
years of schooling 0.015 0.016 0.036 0.012
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.004)***
dummy or share of female -0.109 -0.114 -0.181 0.036
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
unskilled (reference category)
dummy or share of high skilled 0.249 0.238 0.205 0.02
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.002)***
dummy or share of skilled 0.182 0.175 0.208 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.857)
dummy or share of semi-skilled 0.068 0.064 0.061 -0.012
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.062)*
time wage (reference category)
dummy or share of bonus wage 0.055 0.052 0.037 -0.011
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.001)*** (0.011)**
dummy or share of piecework wage 0.109 0.105 0.117 -0.01
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.084)*
dummy or share of piece rate plus bonuses 0.086 0.082 0.076 -0.022
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.191)
dummy or share of mixed wage 0.033 0.031 0.012 -0.007
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.432) (0.136)
dummy Sunday working 0.084 0.081 0.085 0.008
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.154)
dummy night work 0.073 0.071 0.069 -0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.708)
ﬁrm size 100 to 199 employees (reference category)
dummy ﬁrm size 200 to 499 employees 0.022 0.029 0.004
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.094)*
dummy ﬁrm size 500 to 999 employees 0.035 0.046 0.049 0.005
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.105)
dummy ﬁrm size over 1000 employees 0.062 0.074 0.07 0.008
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.013)**
Industry dummies no yes yes no yes no yes
Constant 2.444 2.208 1.987 2.432 1.656 0.163 0.1
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Observations 66075 66075 66075 1934 1934 1919 1919
R-squared 0.127 0.628 0.639 0.223 0.733 0.07 0.184
Adj R-squared 0.127 0.628 0.639 0.22 0.727 0.067 0.167
Robust p values in parentheses * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
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Table 7: Regression analysis of individual log gross hourly wage using instrumental vari-
ables, blue-collar workers’ group in the manufacturing sector, Baden-Wuerttemberg, 1995
and 2001. Source: GSES 1995, 2001; own calcualtions.
ﬁrm-speciﬁc mean ﬁrm-speciﬁc standard deviation
(1[µ]) (2[µ]) (3[µ]) (1[σ]) (2[σ]) (3[σ])
Instrumental variables employ. l2.(cba w/o cc) employ. employ. l2.(cba w/o cc) employ.
l2.(cba w/o cc) l2.(cba w/o cc)
Dummy year 2001 0.203 0.076 0.076 0.025 0.019 0.019
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
CBA w/o oc (i) 0.259 -0.078 -0.069 0.006 -0.009 -0.007
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.509) (0.365) (0.46)
dummy working time oc 0.168 -0.083 -0.076 0.001
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.875)
dummy wage-related oc 0.212 -0.019 -0.023 -0.021
(0.000)*** (0.023)** (0.028)** (0.039)**
dummy ﬁrm-speciﬁc agreement dropped due to collineariy
d_2001timeoc 0.026 0.116 0.117 -0.006 -0.006 -0.004
(0.291) (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.536) (0.616) (0.703)
d_2001wageoc -0.081 -0.027 -0.02 0.001 0 0
(0.000)*** (0.231) (0.387) (0.918) (0.997) (0.986)
age/10 0.11 0.134 0.133 0.088 0.058 0.058
(0.143) (0.050)* (0.052)* (0.000)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
(age/10)2 -0.012 -0.016 -0.016 -0.007 -0.005 -0.005
(0.197) (0.055)* (0.057)* (0.001)*** (0.039)** (0.039)**
tenure/10 0.119 0.138 0.139 0.02 0.017 0.017
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.1) (0.195) (0.195)
(tenure/10)2 -0.025 -0.025 -0.025 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.327) (0.837) (0.836)
years of schooling 0.038 0.02 0.019 0.011 0.013 0.013
(0.000)*** (0.026)** (0.028)** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)***
dummy or share of female -0.156 -0.175 -0.175 0.04 0.036 0.036
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
unskilled (reference category)
dummy or share of high skilled 0.185 0.206 0.207 0.015 0.018 0.019
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.018)** (0.007)*** (0.007)***
dummy or share of skilled 0.211 0.214 0.214 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.902) (0.773) (0.766)
dummy or share of semi-skilled 0.125 0.031 0.031 -0.003 -0.007 -0.007
(0.000)*** (0.063)* (0.059)* (0.591) (0.327) (0.338)
time wage (reference category)
dummy or share of bonus wage 0.02 0.04 0.039 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015
(0.142) (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.005)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)***
dummy or share of piecework wage 0.09 0.121 0.121 -0.014 -0.015 -0.015
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.011)** (0.006)*** (0.006)***
dummy or share of piece rate plus bonuses 0.119 0.066 0.068 -0.017 -0.051 -0.051
(0.045)** (0.3) (0.285) (0.41) (0.052)* (0.053)*
dummy or share of mixed wage 0.016 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.013 -0.013
(0.341) (0.755) (0.739) (0.322) (0.035)** (0.034)**
dummy Sunday working 0.086 0.094 0.094 0.008 0.005 0.005
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.153) (0.372) (0.367)
dummy night work 0.05 0.074 0.074 -0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.296) (0.285) (0.287)
ﬁrmsize 100 to 199 employees (reference category)
dummy ﬁrmsize 200 to 499 employees 0.03 0.042 0.043 0.003 0.005 0.005
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.338) (0.112) (0.111)
dummy ﬁrmsize 500 to 999 employees 0.053 0.067 0.067 0.007 0.007 0.007
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.063)* (0.049)** (0.049)**
dummy ﬁrmsize over 1000 employees 0.023 0.031 0.031 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.001)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.197) (0.522) (0.527)
Industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Constant 1.508 1.953 1.951 0.077 0.092 0.09
(0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***
Observations 1882 1509 1509 1868 1502 1502
Sargan statistic (0.000)*** (0.006)***
Hausman statistic (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)*** (0.0000)***
Robust p values in parentheses * signiﬁcant at 10%; ** signiﬁcant at 5%; *** signiﬁcant at 1%
(i) = instrumented variable
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